Abstract - CEO Centrality

We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality – the relative importance of the
CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power – and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five
compensation captured by the CEO. We find that CEO centrality is negatively associated with
firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q). Greater CEO centrality is also
correlated with (i) lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, (ii) lower stock returns
accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock
return accompanying such announcements, (iii) greater tendency to reward the CEO for luck in
the form of positive industry-wide shocks, (iv) lower likelihood of CEO turnover controlling for
performance, and (v) lower firm-specific variability of stock returns over time. Overall, our results indicate that differences in CEO centrality are an aspect of firm management and
governance that deserves the attention of researchers.

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